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T
he cornerstone of bank supervision is a
regular schedule of thorough, on-site exami-
nations. Under rules set forth in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA), most U.S. banks must submit to
a full-scope federal or state examination every 12
months; small, well-capitalized banks must be
examined every 18 months. These examinations
focus on six components of bank safety and sound-
ness: capital protection (C), asset quality (A), man-
agement competence (M), earnings strength (E),
liquidity risk exposure (L), and market risk sensitiv-
ity (S). At the close of each exam, examiners award
a grade of one (best) through five (worst) to each
component. Supervisors then draw on these six
component ratings to assign a composite CAMELS
rating, which is also expressed on a scale of one
through five. (See the insert for a detailed description
of the composite ratings.) In general, banks with
composite ratings of one or two are considered safe
and sound, whereas banks with ratings of three,
four, or five are considered unsatisfactory. As of
March 31, 2000, nearly 94 percent of U.S. banks
posted composite CAMELS ratings of one or two. 
Bank supervisors support on-site examinations
with off-site surveillance. Off-site surveillance uses
quarterly financial data and anecdotal evidence to
schedule and plan on-site exams. Although on-site
examination is the most effective tool for spotting
safety-and-soundness problems, it is costly and
burdensome. On-site examination is costly to super-
visors because of the examiner resources required
and burdensome to bankers because of the intrusion
into daily operations. Off-site surveillance reduces
the need for unscheduled exams. Off-site surveil-
lance also helps supervisors plan exams by high-
lighting risk exposures at specific institutions.1 For
example, if pre-exam surveillance reports indicate
that a bank has significant exposure to interest rate
fluctuations, then supervisors will add interest-rate-
risk specialists to the exam team.
The two most common surveillance tools are
supervisory screens and econometric models. Super-
visory screens are combinations of financial ratios,
derived from quarterly bank balance sheets and
income statements, that have given warning in the
past about the development of safety-and-soundness
problems. Supervisors draw on their experience to
weigh the information content of these ratios. Econ-
ometric models also combine information from
bank financial ratios. These models rely on statistical
tests rather than human judgment to combine ratios,
boiling the information from financial statements
down to an index number that summarizes bank
condition. In past comparisons, econometric models
have outperformed supervisory screens as early
warning tools (Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan, 1999;
Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther 1995). Nonetheless,
screens still play an important role in off-site surveil-
lance. Supervisors can add screens quickly to mon-
itor emerging sources of risk; econometric models
can be modified only after new risks have produced
a sufficient number of safety-and-soundness prob-
lems to allow re-specification and out-of-sample
testing.
At the Federal Reserve, the off-site surveillance
toolbox includes two distinct econometric models
that are collectively known as SEER—the System
for Estimating Examination Ratings. One model,
the SEER risk rank model, uses the latest quarterly
financial data to estimate the probability that each
Fed-supervised bank will fail within the next two
years. The other model, the SEER rating model, uses
the latest financial data to produce a “shadow”
CAMELS rating for each supervised institution. That
is, the model estimates the CAMELS rating that
examiners would have assigned had the bank been
examined using the most recent set of financial
R. Alton Gilbert is a vice president and banking advisor, Andrew P.
Meyer is an economist, and Mark D. Vaughan is a supervisory policy
officer and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The
authors thank economists Robert Avery, Jeffrey Gunther, James Harvey,
Tom King, Jose Lopez, Don Morgan, Chris Neely, and David Wheelock;
bank supervisors Carl Anderson, Kevin Bertsch, and Kim Nelson; and
seminar participants at the meetings of the SEER Technical Working
Group and the Western Economics Association for their comments.
Judith Hazen provided research assistance.
© 2002, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
1 See Board of Governors (1996) for a description of risk-focused
examination.statements and the previous CAMELS rating. Every
quarter, analysts in the surveillance section at the
Board of Governors feed the latest call report data
into these models and forward the results to the
12 Reserve Banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) also use statistical models in
the off-site surveillance of the banks they supervise.2
The Federal Reserve employs two distinct models
in off-site surveillance to accomplish two distinct
objectives. One objective, embodied in the SEER risk
rank model, is to identify a core set of financial vari-
ables that consistently foreshadows failure. Due to
the paucity of bank failures since the early 1990s,
the coefficients of the risk rank model were last
estimated on data ending in 1991. A fixed-coefficient
model, such as the risk rank model, allows surveil-
lance analysts to gauge how much of any change
in failure probabilities over time is due to changes
in the values of these core financial variables. The
second objective is to allow for changes over time
in the relationship between financial performance
today and bank condition tomorrow. The second
half of the SEER framework, the SEER rating model,
meets this objective by allowing analysts to reesti-
mate the relationship quarterly, adjusting for any
changes in the factors that produce safety-and-
soundness problems. 
Identifying banks with composite CAMELS
ratings of one or two that are at risk of downgrade
to a composite rating of three, four, or five is an-
other important objective of the SEER framework,
although this relationship is not directly estimated
in either SEER model. Supervisors view a downgrade
from safe-and-sound condition to unsatisfactory
condition as serious because three-, four-, and five-
rated banks are much more likely to fail. For exam-
ple, Curry (1997) found that 74 percent of the banks
that failed from 1980 through 1994 held three, four,
or five composite CAMELS ratings two years prior
to failure. Table 1 contains an update of Curry’s
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2 See Reidhill and O’Keefe (1997) for a history of the off-site surveillance
systems at the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC.
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WHAT ARE CAMELS RATINGS?
CAMELS composite rating Description
Safe and sound
1 Financial institutions with a composite one rating are sound in every respect
and generally have individual component ratings of one or two. 
2 Financial institutions with a composite two rating are fundamentally sound. 
In general, a two-rated institution will have no individual component ratings
weaker than three. 
Unsatisfactory
3 Financial institutions with a composite three rating exhibit some degree of 
supervisory concern in one or more of the component areas. 
4 Financial institutions with a composite four rating generally exhibit unsafe 
and unsound practices or conditions. They have serious financial or 
managerial deficiencies that result in unsatisfactory performance. 
5 Financial institutions with a composite five rating generally exhibit extremely
unsafe and unsound practices or conditions. Institutions in this group pose
a significant risk to the deposit insurance fund and their failure is highly 
probable. 
NOTE: CAMELS is an acronym for six components of bank safety and soundness: capital protection (C), asset quality (A), manage-
ment competence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity risk exposure (L), and market risk sensitivity (S). Examiners assign a grade
of one (best) through five (worst) to each component. They also use these six scores to award a composite rating, also expressed
on a one-through-five scale. As a rule, banks with composite ratings of one or two are considered safe and sound while banks
with ratings of three, four, or five are considered unsatisfactory.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Commercial Bank Examination Manual.figures, indicating that 53 of the 58 banks (91 per-
cent) that failed in the years 1993 through 1998 held
unsatisfactory ratings at least one year prior to fail-
ure. Because of their high failure risk, banks in un-
satisfactory condition receive constant supervisory
attention. An econometric model designed to flag
safe-and-sound banks at risk of downgrade could
help allocate supervisory resources not already
devoted to troubled institutions. Such a model might
also yield even earlier warning of emerging financial
distress—warning that could reduce the likelihood
of eventual failure by allowing earlier supervisory
intervention. Although SEER failure probabilities
and “shadow” CAMELS ratings for one- and two-rated
banks certainly provide clues about downgrade
risks, these index numbers are not the product of
a model estimated specifically to flag downgrade
candidates.
Even so, the SEER models may produce “watch
lists” of one- and two-rated banks that differ little
from watch lists produced by a downgrade-prediction
model. The CAMELS downgrade model, the SEER
risk rank model, and the SEER rating model generate
ordinal rankings of banks based on risk. The models
differ by the specific measure of overall risk—the
risk of failure (SEER risk rank model), the risk of
receiving a poor current CAMELS rating (SEER rating
model), or the risk of moving from satisfactory to
unsatisfactory condition in the near future (down-
grade model). The models also differ by the sample
of banks used for estimation—the SEER models are
estimated on all commercial banks, whereas a down-
grade model is estimated only on one- and two-rated
institutions. But if the financial factors that explain
CAMELS downgrades differ little from the financial
factors that explain failures or CAMELS ratings, then
all three models will produce similar risk rankings
and, hence, similar watch lists of one- and two-rated
banks. Only formal empirical tests can determine
the potential contribution of a downgrade-prediction
model to off-site surveillance at the Federal Reserve.
To answer our title question—could a CAMELS
downgrade model improve off-site surveillance—
we compare the out-of-sample performance of a
downgrade-prediction model and the SEER models
using 1990s data. We find only slight differences in
the ability of the three models to spot emerging
financial distress among safe-and-sound banks.
Specifically, in out-of-sample tests for 1992 through
1998, the watch lists produced by the downgrade-
prediction model outperform the watch lists pro-
duced by the SEER models by only a small margin.
We conclude that, in relatively tranquil banking
environments like the 1990s, a downgrade model
adds little value in off-site surveillance. We caution,
however, that a downgrade-prediction model might
prove useful in more turbulent banking times. 
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
Our downgrade-prediction model is a probit
regression that uses bank financial data to estimate
the probability each sample bank will tumble from
a composite CAMELS rating of one or two to a com-
posite CAMELS rating of three, four, or five. Specifi-
cally, the dependent variable takes a value of one
for any bank whose CAMELS rating falls from satis-
factory to unsatisfactory in the 24 months following
the quarter of the financial data; the dependent vari-
able is zero if the bank is examined but not down-
graded in the 24-month window. Although bank
failure declined dramatically in the 1990s, CAMELS
downgrades were still common, thereby allowing
frequent reestimation of the model. (See Table 2
for data on CAMELS downgrades in the 1990s.) The
SEER risk rank model is also a probit model, using
financial data to estimate the probability that a Fed-
supervised bank will fail or see its tangible capital
fall below 2 percent of total assets in the next 24
months. The SEER rating model is a multinomial
logit regression that uses financial data to estimate
a “shadow” CAMELS rating—the composite rating
that examiners would have awarded had the bank
been examined that quarter. A multinomial logit
differs from a standard logit by predicting a range
of discrete values (in this case CAMELS composite
ratings, which range from one to five) rather than
two discrete values (failure/no failure or downgrade/
no downgrade).
The explanatory variables for the downgrade-
prediction model include a set of financial perfor-
mance ratios and a bank size variable that all appear
in the SEER risk rank model, as well as two additional
CAMELS-related variables. Table 3 describes the
explanatory variables and the expected relationship
between each variable and the likelihood of a future
downgrade. The financial performance ratios capture
the impact of leverage risk, credit risk, and liquidity
risk—three risks that have consistently produced
financial distress in commercial banks (Putnam,
1983; Cole and Gunther, 1998). The bank size and
CAMELS-related variables capture the impact of
other factors that may affect downgrade risk.
The downgrade-prediction model captures
leverage risk with total equity minus goodwill as a
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How Often Did Unsatisfactory Banks Fail in the 1990s?
Percentage of 
all failures with 
CAMELS rating  Number of  Number of  Percentage  CAMELS ratings of 
at least one year  banks in each  failures in each  failed in each  3, 4, or 5 one year 
Year of failure prior to failure CAMELS cohort CAMELS cohort CAMELS cohort in advance
1993 1 2,396 1 0.04 91.7
2 6,549 2 0.03
3 1,877 4 0.21
4 762 14 1.84
5 218 15 6.88
1994 1 2,508 0 0.00 90.9
2 6,693 1 0.01
3 1,578 0 0.00
4 562 5 0.89
5 124 5 4.03
1995 1 3,299 0 0.00 100
2 6,469 0 0.00
3 916 0 0.00
4 303 2 0.66
5 56 3 5.36
1996 1 3,759 0 0.00 75.0
2 5,995 1 0.02
3 587 1 0.17
4 158 1 0.63
5 39 1 2.56
1997 1 4,041 0 0.00 100
2 5,472 0 0.00
3 400 0 0.00
4 91 1 1.10
5 23 0 0.00
1998 1 4,328 0 0.00 100
2 4,941 0 0.00
3 329 0 0.00
4 57 1 1.75
5 15 0 0.00
NOTE: This Table shows that banks with composite CAMELS ratings of one or two were less likely to fail in the 1990s than were banks
with composite ratings of three, four, or five. The number of failed banks that were classified as unsatisfactory banks (CAMELS three, four,
or five composite ratings) at least one year prior to failure are shown in bold. Supervisors recognized that these banks were significant
failure risks and, therefore, monitored them closely. Because supervisors do not monitor CAMELS one- and two-rated banks as closely,
they are interested in a tool that can identify which of these institutions is most likely to encounter financial distress.
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percentage of total assets (NET WORTH) and net
income as a percentage of total assets (or, return on
assets [ROA]). Leverage risk is the risk that losses
will exceed capital, rendering a bank insolvent. We
expect higher levels of capital (lower leverage risk)
to reduce the likelihood of CAMELS downgrades. We
include ROA in the leverage risk category because
retained earnings are an important source of addi-
tional capital for many banks and because higher
earnings provide a greater cushion for withstanding
adverse economic shocks (Berger, 1995). We expect
that higher earnings reduce the risk of a future
downgrade.
The downgrade-prediction model captures
credit risk with the ratio of loans 30 to 89 days past
due to total assets (PAST-DUE 30), the ratio of loans
over 89 days past due to total assets (PAST-DUE 90),
the ratio of loans in nonaccrual status to total assets
(NONACCRUING), the ratio of other real estate owned
to total assets (OREO), the ratio of commercial and
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How Common Were CAMELS Downgrades in the 1990s?
Number of banks  Percentage of banks Total number of 
downgraded to downgraded to downgrades to 
Year of  CAMELS rating at  Number of  unsatisfactory unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
downgrade beginning of year  banks status status status
1990 1 2,182 38 1.74 728
2 5,572 690 12.38
1991 1 2,189 34 1.55 698
2 5,475 664 12.13
1992 1 1,959 22 1.12 424
2 5,275 402 7.62
1993 1 2,289 7 0.31 182
2 5,976 175 2.93
1994 1 2,910 9 0.31 162
2 5,717 153 2.68
1995 1 3,091 8 0.26 102
2 4,885 94 1.92
1996 1 3,260 10 0.31 126
2 4,487 116 2.59
1997 1 3,223 7 0.22 123
2 3,719 116 3.12
1998 1 3,006 19 0.63 153
2 3,090 134 4.34
NOTE: This Table demonstrates that downgrades from safe-and-sound to unsatisfactory status were common in the 1990s, thereby
making it possible to reestimate a downgrade-prediction model on a yearly basis. Specifically, the far right column shows the number
of sample banks rated as safe and sound (CAMELS one or two) at each year-end that were downgraded to unsatisfactory status (CAMELS
three, four, or five) within the following year. Note that two-rated banks were much more likely to slip into unsatisfactory status than
one-rated banks. Note also that the percentage of banks suffering downgrades to unsatisfactory status fell as overall banking performance
improved in the mid-1990s, but the trend reversed in the late 1990s.
Table 2industrial loans to total assets (COMMERCIAL LOANS),
and the ratio of residential real estate loans to total
assets (RESIDENTIAL LOANS). Credit risk is the risk
that borrowers will fail to make promised interest
and principal payments. The model contains six
measures of credit risk because this risk was the
driving force behind bank failures in the late 1980s
and early 1990s (Hanc, 1997). We include the past-
due and nonaccruing loan ratios because banks
charge off higher percentages of these loans than
loans whose payments are current.3 We include
other real estate owned, which consists primarily of
collateral seized after loan defaults, because a high
OREO ratio often signals poor credit risk manage-
ment—either because a bank has had to foreclose on
a large number of loans or because it has had trouble
disposing of seized collateral. PAST-DUE 30, PAST-
DUE 90, NONACCRUING, and OREO are backward-
looking because they register asset quality problems
that have already emerged (Morgan and Stiroh, 2001).
To give the model a forward-looking dimension,
we add the commercial-and-industrial-loan ratio
because, historically, the charge-off rate for these
loans has been higher than for other types of loans.
We also employ the residential real estate ratio
because, historically, losses on these loans have
been relatively low. With the exception of the resi-
dential loan ratio, we expect a positive relationship
between the credit risk measures and downgrade
probability.
The downgrade-prediction model captures
liquidity risk with investment securities as a per-
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current revenue, even if the borrower falls behind on interest payments.
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What Factors Help Predict Downgrades to Unsatisfactory Condition (CAMELS Three, Four, or
Five)?
Hypothesized 
Independent variables (risk proxies) Symbol relationship 
Leverage risk
Total net worth (equity capital minus goodwill) as a percentage  NET WORTH –
of total assets
Net income as a percentage of average assets (return on average assets) ROA –
Credit risk
Loans past due 30-89 days as a percentage of total assets PAST-DUE 30 +
Loans past due 90+ days as a percentage of total assets PAST-DUE 90 +
Nonaccrual loans as a percentage of total assets NONACCRUING +
Other real estate owned as a percentage of total assets OREO +
Commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total assets COMMERCIAL LOANS +
Residential real estate loans as a percentage of total assets RESIDENTIAL LOANS –
Liquidity risk
Book value of securities as a percentage of total assets SECURITIES –
Deposits >$100M (jumbo CDs) as a percentage of total assets LARGE TIME DEPOSITS +
Non-financial variables
Natural logarithm of total assets, in thousands of dollars SIZE ?
Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank has a CAMELS rating of 2 CAMELS-2 +
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank’s management rating is worse  BAD MANAGE +
than its composite CAMELS rating
NOTE: This Table lists the independent variables used in the downgrade-prediction model. The signs indicate the hypothesized relationship
between each variable and the likelihood of a downgrade from satisfactory status (a CAMELS one or two composite rating) to unsatis-
factory status (a CAMELS three, four, or five rating). For example, the negative sign for the net worth ratio indicates that, other things
equal, higher net worth today reduces the likelihood of a downgrade to unsatisfactory status tomorrow.
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centage of total assets (SECURITIES) and jumbo
certificates of deposit (CDs) as a percentage of total
assets (LARGE TIME DEPOSITS). Liquidity risk is
the risk that a bank will be unable to fund loan
commitments or meet withdrawal demands at a
reasonable cost. A larger stock of liquid assets—
such as investment securities—indicates a greater
ability to meet unexpected liquidity needs and
should, therefore, translate into a lower downgrade
probability. Liquidity risk also depends on a bank’s
reliance on non-core funding. Core funding—which
includes checking accounts, savings accounts, and
small time deposits—is relatively insensitive to the
difference between the interest rate paid by the
bank and the market rate. Non-core funding—which
includes jumbo CDs—can be quite sensitive to inter-
est rate differentials. All other things equal, greater
reliance on jumbo CDs implies a greater likelihood
of a funding runoff or an interest expense shock
and, hence, a future CAMELS downgrade.
The downgrade-prediction model also includes
variables that capture the impact of asset size, bank
heterogeneity, and management competence on
downgrade risk. We add the natural logarithm of
total assets (SIZE) because large banks can reduce
risk by diversifying across product lines and geo-
graphic regions. As Demsetz and Strahan (1997)
have noted, however, geographic diversification
relaxes a constraint, enabling bankers to assume
more risk, so we make no prediction about the
relationship between size and downgrade probabil-
ity. We include a dummy variable equal to one if a
bank’s composite CAMELS rating is two; we do this
because two-rated banks tumble into unsatisfactory
status more often than one-rated banks. (See Table 2
for data on the downgrade rates for one- and two-
rated institutions.) Finally we employ a dummy
variable (BAD MANAGE) equal to one if the manage-
ment component of the CAMELS rating is higher
(weaker) than the composite rating. In these cases,
examiners have registered concerns about the qual-
ity of bank management, even though these prob-
lems have yet to produce financial consequences.
After estimating the downgrade-prediction
model, we use all three models to produce rank
orderings, or “watch lists,” of one- and two-rated
banks. With the downgrade model, the list ranks
safe-and-sound banks from the highest probability
of tumbling into unsatisfactory condition to the low-
est. With the SEER risk rank model, the list ranks
safe-and-sound banks from the highest probability
of failing to the lowest. With the SEER rating model,
the list ranks safe-and-sound banks from the high-
est (weakest) shadow CAMELS rating to the lowest.
Although each model produces a different index
number, they all may produce similar ordinal rank-
ings. Supervisors could use the SEER framework to
monitor safe-and-sound banks by focusing on the
riskiest one- or two-rated banks as identified by
either the rating or failure-prediction model. Again,
only a formal test of out-of-sample performance can
gauge the value added by a customized downgrade-
prediction model. Out-of-sample tests—which use
an evaluation period subsequent to the estimation
period—are crucial because supervisors use econo-
metric models this way in practice. 
We compare out-of-sample performance of
the watch lists by examining the type-one and type-
two error rates associated with each list. Type-one
errors are sometimes called false negatives; type-two
errors are false positives. Each type of error is costly
to supervisors. A missed downgrade—a type-one
error—is costly because an accurate downgrade
prediction gives supervisors more warning about
emerging financial distress, and early intervention
reduces the likelihood of failure. A type-two error
occurs when a predicted downgrade does not
materialize. An over-predicted downgrade is costly
because it wastes scarce supervisory resources on
a healthy bank. Type-two errors also impose unnec-
essary costs on healthy banks because on-site exam-
inations disrupt day-to-day operations.
Following Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995),
we generate power curves for the three watch lists
that indicate the minimum achievable type-one
error rates for any desired type-two error rate. (These
curves are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.) Power
curves allow comparison of each list’s ability to
reduce false negatives and false positives simultane-
ously. A more theoretically appealing approach
would minimize a loss function that places an
explicit weight on the benefits of early warning
about financial distress and the costs of wasted
examination resources and unnecessary disruption
of bank activities. The relative performance of the
watch lists could then be assessed for the optimal
type-one (or type-two) error rate. Unfortunately,
the data necessary to pursue such an approach are
unavailable. Without concrete data about supervi-
sor loss functions, we opt for power curves that
make no assumptions about the weights that should
be placed on type-one and type-two errors. This
approach also allows supervisors to use our results
to compare model performance over any desired
range of error rates. 
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shows the type-one and type-two error rates when
an ordinal ranking based on failure probability is
interpreted as a rank ordering of downgrade risk.
We trace out the curve by starting with the assump-
tion that no one- or two-rated bank is a downgrade
risk. This assumption implies that all subsequent
downgrades are surprises, making the type-one error
rate 100 percent. In this case, the type-two error rate
is zero because no banks are incorrectly classified
as downgrade risks. We obtain the next point by
selecting the one- or two-rated bank with the highest
failure probability. If the selected bank suffers a sub-
sequent downgrade, then the type-one error rate for
the SEER risk rank watch list decreases slightly. The
type-two error rate remains at zero because, again,
no institutions are incorrectly classified as down-
grade risks. If the selected bank does not suffer a
downgrade, then the type-one error rate remains at
100 percent and the type-two error rate increases
slightly. By selecting banks in order of their failure
probability and recalculating type-one and type-two
error rates, we can trace out a power curve. At the
lower right extreme of the curve, the entire failure
probability rank ordering is considered at risk of a
downgrade. At this extreme, the SEER risk rank watch
list posts a type-one error rate equal to zero percent
and a type-two error rate equal to 100 percent. 
The area under the power curves provides a
basis for comparing the out-of-sample performance
of each watch list. A smaller area implies a lower
overall type-one and type-two error rate and a more
accurate model. We express the area for each watch
list as a percentage of the total area in the box. A
useful benchmark is the case in which downgrade
risks are selected at random. Random selection of
one- and two-rated banks, over a large number of
trials, produces power curves with an average slope
of –1. The area under a “random” watch list power
curve equals, on average, 50 percent of the area of
the entire box. 
THE DATA
We exploit two data sources for our analysis—
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC) and the National Information Center
of the Federal Reserve System (NIC). We use income
and balance sheet data from the Reports of Condition
and Income (the call reports), which are collected
under the auspices of the FFIEC. The FFIEC requires
all commercial banks to submit quarterly call
reports to their principal supervisors; most call report
items are available to the public. We rely on CAMELS
composite and management ratings from the NIC
database. This database is available to examiners
and analysts in the banking supervision function of
the Federal Reserve System but not to the public. We
also draw on the NIC database for the SEER failure
probabilities and “shadow” CAMELS ratings. 
To ensure an unbiased comparison of the
models, we exclude any bank with an operating
history under five years from the estimation sample
for the downgrade-prediction model. The financial
ratios of these start-up, or de novo, banks often
take extreme values that do not signal safety-and-
soundness problems (DeYoung, 1999). For example,
de novos often lose money in their early years, so
their earnings ratios are poor. These extreme values
distort model coefficients and could compromise the
relative performance of the downgrade-prediction
model. Another reason for excluding de novos is that
supervisors already monitor these banks closely.
The Federal Reserve conducts a full-scope on-site
examination every six months for a newly chartered
state-member bank.4 Full-scope exams continue on
this schedule until the de novo earns a one or two
composite CAMELS rating for two consecutive exams.
As an additional safeguard, we use a timing
convention for estimating the downgrade-prediction
model that corresponds to the timing convention
used to estimate the SEER risk rank model. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the downgrade model six times—
each time using financial data for one- and two-rated
institutions in the fourth quarter of year t and down-
grade status (1=downgrade, 0=no downgrade) in
years t+1 and t+2. For example, to produce the
first downgrade equation (reported as the “1990-91”
equation in Table 4), we use a sample of banks rated
CAMELS one or two as of December 31, 1989. We
then regress downgrade status during 1990 and
1991 on fourth quarter 1989 data. A bank that is
examined but maintains a one or two rating dur-
ing the entire two-year period is classified as “no
downgrade.” A bank that is examined and suffers
a downgrade to a three, four, or five composite rat-
ing anytime in the two-year period is classified as
“downgrade.” 
Finally, when comparing out-of-sample perfor-
mance of the models, we note biases that result from
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using revised call report data rather than originally
submitted call report data. Supervisors sometimes
require banks to revise their call report data after
an on-site examination. Indeed, some economists
have argued that this auditing function is the princi-
pal value of examinations (Berger and Davies, 1998;
Flannery and Houston, 1999). Revisions of fourth
quarter data tend to be particularly large because
banks strive to make their year-end financial reports
look as healthy as possible (Allen and Saunders,
1992). Gunther and Moore (2000) have found that
early warning models estimated on revised data out-
perform models estimated on originally submitted
data. Because of this evidence, estimation and simu-
lation of an early warning model with the original
data, rather than the revised data, would provide a
more appropriate test of the value of a model for
surveillance. The original data, however, are not
available for all banks and all periods. Hence, we
estimate the downgrade model on revised rather
than original call report data. The coefficients of
the SEER risk rank model were estimated using
revised call report data, and we apply these coeffi-
cients to revised call report data to generate failure
probability rankings. Because the SEER risk rank
model and the downgrade-prediction model are
estimated with revised data, our performance com-
parisons do not favor either model ex ante. But
because the SEER rating model was estimated on
originally submitted call report data, out-of-sample
comparisons favor the downgrade-prediction model
over the rating model. Data limitations do not allow
us to correct for this bias, so we bear it in mind as
we interpret the power curve evidence for these
two models. 
IN-SAMPLE FIT OF THE DOWNGRADE-
PREDICTION MODEL
As noted, we estimate the downgrade-prediction
model six times—first regressing downgrade status
in 1990 and 1991 on fourth quarter 1989 financial
data, then regressing downgrade status in 1991 and
1992 on fourth quarter 1990 data, and so on, up
through regressing downgrade status in 1995 and
1996 on fourth quarter 1994 data. The results of
these regressions appear in Table 4. 
Overall, the downgrade-prediction model fits the
data relatively well in-sample. For each of the six
regressions, the log-likelihood test statistic allows
rejection of the hypothesis that all model coefficients
equal zero at the 1 percent level of significance. The
pseudo-R
2, which indicates the approximate propor-
tion of the variance of downgrade/no downgrade
status explained by the model, ranges from a low
of 14.9 percent for the 1993-94 equation to a high
of 22.4 percent for the 1991-92 equation. These
pseudo-R
2numbers may seem low, particularly when
viewed against the figures for failure-prediction
models—the pseudo-R
2 for the SEER risk rank model
is 63.2 percent—but CAMELS downgrades are less
severe than outright failures and, therefore, much
more difficult to forecast. In this light, the pseudo-R
2
figures look more respectable. The estimated coef-
ficients on eight explanatory variables—the jumbo-
CD-to-total-asset ratio, the net-worth-to-total-asset
ratio, the past-due and nonaccruing loan ratios, the
net-income-to-total-asset ratio, and the two CAMELS
dummy variables—are statistically significant with
the expected sign in all six equations. The coefficient
on the size variable has a mixed-sign pattern, which
is not surprising, given the theoretical ambiguity in
the relationship between bank size and risk. The
coefficients on the other four explanatory variables
are statistically significant with the expected sign
in at least three of the six equations. 
The in-sample fit of the downgrade-prediction
model does deteriorate slightly through time. The
log-likelihood statistic declines monotonically from
the 1991-92 equation through the 1995-96 equation.
Indeed, the psuedo-R
2 averages 20.7 percent for the
first three equations (1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93) and
16.5 percent for the last three equations (1993-94,
1994-95, 1995-96). The number of statistically
significant coefficients with expected signs also
declines slightly over the estimation years. For
instance, the coefficients on the commercial-and-
industrial-loan-to-total-asset ratio are statistically
significant with the expected sign in the first three
equations but in only one of the last three equations
(1995-96). The monotonic deterioration in model
fit reflects the decline in the number of downgrades.
In the first three regressions, the average number
of downgrades per year was 500; in the last three
regressions, the average dropped to 127 downgrades
per year. 
OUT-OF-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE
COMPARISONS OF THE SEER RISK
RANK MODEL, THE SEER RATING
MODEL, AND THE DOWNGRADE-
PREDICTION MODEL
With a timing convention that mimics the way
supervisors use econometric models in surveillance,
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we conduct six separate tests of the out-of-sample
performance of the downgrade-prediction model.
As noted, the first downgrade-prediction model
regresses downgrade status in 1990 and 1991 on
year-end 1989 financial data. By the end of 1991,
supervisors would have had coefficient estimates
from that regression. Our first out-of-sample test
applies those coefficients to year-end 1991 finan-
cial ratios to compute downgrade probabilities for
each sample bank. We then use the ranking of
downgrade probabilities to construct power curves
for type-one and type-two errors over the 1992-93
test window. To ensure compatibility between the
in-sample and out-of-sample data, we limit the first
out-of-sample test to banks with five-year operating
histories, with CAMELS ratings of one or two as of
year-end 1991, and with at least one full-scope
examination in 1992 or 1993. The next five out-of-
sample tests of the downgrade-prediction model—
for the 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, and
1997-98 windows—employ the same timing con-
vention and the same sample restrictions. 
Our out-of-sample tests of the SEER risk rank
and the SEER rating models use the same timing
convention as the out-of-sample tests of the down-
grade-prediction model. Specifically, we apply the
fixed SEER risk rank coefficients to year-end 1991
data and rank the one- and two-rated banks by their
estimated probabilities of failure. We then derive a
power curve reflecting the type-one and type-two
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How Well Did the CAMELS Downgrade-Prediction Model Perform In-Sample?
Years of downgrades in CAMELS ratings
Explanatory variables 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
Intercept –2.053*** (0.232) –0.923*** (0.249) –0.284 (0.290)
COMMERCIAL LOANS 0.010*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003)
RESIDENTIAL LOANS –0.005** (0.002) –0.003 (0.002) –0.004 (0.003)
LARGE TIME DEPOSITS 0.017*** (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.004)
NET WORTH –0.053*** (0.008) –0.050*** (0.010) –0.049*** (0.011)
PAST-DUE 90 0.396*** (0.038) 0.304*** (0.039) 0.232*** (0.045)
PAST-DUE 30 0.100*** (0.021) 0.136*** (0.021) 0.151*** (0.025)
NONACCRUING 0.227*** (0.027) 0.201*** (0.030) 0.188*** (0.035)
ROA –0.242*** (0.031) –0.330*** (0.038) –0.104*** (0.038)
SECURITIES –0.015*** (0.002) –0.017*** (0.002) –0.014*** (0.002)
OREO 0.212*** (0.030) 0.210*** (0.032) 0.021 (0.033)
SIZE 0.076*** (0.016) –0.029* (0.017) –0.128*** (0.022)
CAMELS-2 0.622*** (0.060) 0.542*** (0.067) 0.577*** (0.081)
BAD MANAGE 0.488*** (0.050) 0.405*** (0.053) 0.429*** (0.058)
Number of observations 8,927 8,636 8,361
Pseudo-R
2 0.218 0.224 0.179
–2 log likelihood testing whether all  5,909.617*** 5,020.667*** 3,476.658***
coefficients (except the intercept) = 0
NOTE: This Table contains the estimated regression coefficients for the downgrade-prediction model. The model regresses downgrade
status (1 for a downgrade and 0 for no downgrade) in calendar years t+1 and t+2 on explanatory variables from the fourth quarter
of year t. See Table 3 for the definitions of the explanatory variables. Standard errors appear in parentheses next to the coefficients.
One asterisk denotes significance at the 10 percent level, two asterisks denote significance at the 5 percent level, and three asterisks
denote significance at the 1 percent level. Shading highlights coefficients that were significant with the expected sign in all six years.
The pseudo-R
2 gives the approximate proportion of the total variance of downgrade status explained by the model. Overall, the
downgrade-prediction model predicts in-sample downgrades well. Eight of the 13 regression variables are significant with the predicted
sign in all six years, and all of the variables are significant in at least some years. Note that, by most measures of in-sample fit, the model
declines in power over time, primarily due to the decrease in the number of downgrades.
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errors of this ordinal ranking, assuming that a higher
failure probability at year-end 1991 indicates a
higher downgrade probability in 1992 and 1993. For
each year of the sample, we repeat this procedure,
applying the fixed SEER risk rank model coefficients
to the end-of-year call report data for one- and two-
rated banks. Because SEER rating model estimates
are not available for 1991 and 1992, we start out-of-
sample testing of this model with “shadow” CAMELS
ratings based on year-end 1993 data. We derive a
power curve for the ordinal ranking of shadow
CAMELS ratings based on the assumption that higher
(weaker) estimated ratings indicate higher down-
grade risk in 1994 and 1995. We use the same timing
convention for the remaining three out-of-sample
tests of the rating model (1995-96, 1996-97, and
1997-98). 
Using any of the three models to flag downgrade
candidates markedly improves the results compared
with randomly selecting one- and two-rated banks.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the out-
of-sample performance tests of the downgrade-
prediction model and the two SEER models. Figures
1 and 2 offer the same information in visual form.
Over the four test windows that include both SEER
models—1994-95 through 1997-98—the average
area under the power curves for the three models is
20.78 percent, substantially less than the 50 percent
area under the power curve for random selection.
Over all six test windows—1992-93 through 1997-
98—the average of the area under the downgrade-
prediction power curve and the SEER risk rank power
curve equals 21.41 percent. Across individual models
and individual years, the areas range from a high of
26.59 percent for the SEER risk rank model in flag-
ging 1994-95 downgrades to a low of 15.14 percent
for the downgrade-prediction model in flagging
1996-97 downgrades. 
Overall, the downgrade-prediction model
slightly outperforms the two SEER models in the
out-of-sample performance comparisons. Over four
tests covering the years 1994 through 1998, the
downgrade-prediction model produces an average
power curve area of 18.48 percent, whereas the two
SEER models, on average, produce an area of 21.93
percent. Over six tests covering 1992 through 1998,
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How Well Did the CAMELS Downgrade-Prediction Model Perform In-Sample?
Years of downgrades in CAMELS ratings
Explanatory variables 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96
Intercept 0.340 (0.358) –0.809** (0.379) 0.069 (0.425)
COMMERCIAL LOANS 0.005 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.013** (0.005)
RESIDENTIAL LOANS –0.005 (0.003) –0.002 (0.003) –0.013*** (0.004)
LARGE TIME DEPOSITS 0.018*** (0.005) 0.023*** (0.005) 0.021*** (0.005)
NET WORTH –0.094*** (0.014) –0.025* (0.013) –0.034*** (0.012)
PAST-DUE 90 0.329*** (0.058) 0.286*** (0.063) 0.324*** (0.073)
PAST-DUE 30 0.169*** (0.032) 0.113*** (0.034) 0.162*** (0.035)
NONACCRUING 0.148*** (0.046) 0.183*** (0.045) 0.146*** (0.050)
ROA –0.137*** (0.040) –0.252*** (0.050) –0.162*** (0.038)
SECURITIES –0.007*** (0.002) –0.003 (0.003) –0.010*** (0.003)
OREO 0.080* (0.041) 0.193*** (0.044) 0.154*** (0.052)
SIZE –0.171*** (0.027) –0.149*** (0.030) –0.210*** (0.034)
CAMELS-2 0.444*** (0.095) 0.625*** (0.103) 0.590*** (0.102)
BAD MANAGE 0.453*** (0.066) 0.406*** (0.073) 0.515*** (0.078)
Number of observations 8,600 9,169 9,200
Pseudo-R
2 0.149 0.153 0.193
–2 log likelihood testing whether all  2,248.122*** 1,911.719*** 1,628.444***
coefficients (except the intercept) = 0
Table 4 cont’dGilbert, Meyer, Vaughan REVIEW
the downgrade-prediction model generates an aver-
age area of 19.60 percent; the SEER risk rank model
generates an average area of 23.23 percent. In each
of the six test windows, the downgrade-prediction
model outperforms the SEER risk rank model, the
difference in area ranging from 1.05 percentage
points for the 1992-93 window to 5.54 percentage
points for the 1997-98 window. The downgrade-
prediction model outperforms the SEER rating model
in three of the four test windows, with area differ-
entials ranging from 1.22 percentage points for
the 1997-98 test to 4.73 percentage points for the
1995-96 test. Only in the 1994-95 test did the SEER
rating model outperform the downgrade model—
by an area differential of 0.43 percentage points. 
Still, the difference between the out-of-sample
performance of the downgrade-prediction model
and the SEER models is quite small. On average over
all tests, the downgrade model outperforms the
SEER models by an area differential of just 2.48
percentage points. Over the restricted area (with
less than a 20 percent type-two error), the area
differential is even smaller—only 0.62 percentage
points. At the same time, on average, the two SEER
models outperform random selection by an area
differential of 27.93 percentage points. Moreover,
the out-of-sample tests are biased in favor of the
downgrade-prediction model in two respects: the
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How Did the Out-of-Sample Performance of the Downgrade-Prediction Model and the SEER
Models Compare?
Panel A: Area under power curves 
Downgrade years Downgrade model (%) SEER risk rank model (%) SEER rating model (%)
1992-93 21.01 22.06 NA
1993-94 22.64 25.54 NA
1994-95 22.31 26.59 21.88
1995-96 17.40 21.45 22.13
1996-97 15.14 19.09 19.35
1997-98 19.08 24.62 20.30
Mean over all years 19.60 23.23 20.92
Panel B: Area under power curves below 20 percent type-two error rate
Downgrade years Downgrade model (%) SEER risk rank model (%) SEER rating model (%)
1992-93 12.03 12.32 NA
1993-94 12.14 12.61 NA
1994-95 11.87 12.70 11.95
1995-96 10.72 11.66 11.82
1996-97 10.28 11.24 11.52
1997-98 10.92 12.28 11.73
Mean over all years 11.33 12.14 11.76 
NOTE: This Table contains the areas under each model’s power curve for each two-year test window. Each power curve reveals the
trade-offs between type-one errors (missed downgrades) and type-two errors (over-predicted downgrades) for a particular model. We
assess relative performance by comparing areas under the curves; smaller is better because smaller areas imply simultaneous reduction
of both types of errors. The SEER rating model data were not available before 1993, so the Table contains no shadow CAMELS areas for
the 1992-93 and 1993-94 test windows. When comparing areas, we bear in mind that the area produced by a randomly generated watch
list equals, on average, 50 percent. Although all three models improve considerably over random selection of downgrade candidates,
the downgrade-prediction model does not materially outperform the two SEER models (Panel A). When the maximum allowable type-
two error rate is 20 percent, the results are virtually identical (Panel B). We use this cut-off as representative of model comparisons
when supervisors insist on small watch lists.
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coefficients on the SEER risk rank model have been
fixed since 1991, and the SEER rating model is esti-
mated on originally submitted call report data. The
small difference in performance, particularly when
viewed in light of these potential biases, suggests
that the SEER models and our customized down-
grade-prediction model flag downgrade candidates
equally well.
Analyzing a region with low type-two error rates
confirms that the out-of-sample performances of
the downgrade-prediction model and those of the
SEER models are comparable. If monitoring healthy
banks were costless, then supervisors would want
a watch list long enough to catch all downgrade
risks—a list that produced a zero type-one error rate.
But because monitoring healthy banks is costly,
supervisors would prefer a watch list that is reason-
ably sized. Panel B of Table 5 contains the areas
under the power curves for all three models when
the maximum allowable type-two error rate is 20
percent. Over this restricted region, the difference
in the performance of the downgrade-prediction
model and the two SEER models—again, expressed
in terms of average areas under power curves over
multiple tests—is less than 1 percentage point. Al-
though the 20 percent threshold is arbitrary, it con-
veys a larger message—that the small difference
between the performance of the downgrade model
and the SEER models becomes even smaller when
the comparison focuses on regions where supervi-
sors are likely to operate.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To check the robustness of our findings, we
experimented with a “fresh” set of explanatory
variables for each of the six downgrade-prediction
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Using Year-End 1991 Data
1993-94 Downgrade Predictions
Using Year-End 1992 Data
NOTE: This Figure shows that the SEER risk rank model and the downgrade model have similar type-one vs. type-two tradeoffs for
most of the range of errors for 1992-93 and 1993-94 downgrades. The downgrade model slightly edges out the SEER failure model by 
21.01 percent to 22.06 percent for the 1992-93 downgrades, and by 22.64 percent to 25.54 percent for the 1993-94 downgrades. The
SEER rating model numbers were not available before 1993, so a SEER rating model power curve does not appear in the Figure.
This Figure depicts the trade-off between the type-one error rate and the type-two error rate for the SEER risk rank model, SEER 
rating model, and the downgrade model. The type-one error rate is the number of missed downgrades (false negatives) divided 
by the total number of CAMELS one- and two-rated banks; the type-two error rate is the number of incorrectly flagged downgrades 
(false positives) divided by the total number of CAMELS one- and two-rated banks. The area under each curve, divided by the total 
area in the box, offers a convenient way to compare the performance of each model. Smaller areas imply lower levels of both types of 
errors and, hence, better model performance. The 50 percent line indicates the type-one and type-two error rates associated with 
random selection of one- and two-rated banks.
How Well Do the Models Predict Out-of-Sample CAMELS Downgrades?
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How Well Do the Models Predict Out-of-Sample CAMELS Downgrades?

































































































Using Year-End 1993 Data
1995-96 Downgrade Predictions
Using Year-End 1994 Data
1997-98 Downgrade Predictions
Using Year-End 1996 Data
1996-97 Downgrade Predictions
Using Year-End 1995 Data
NOTE: This Figure shows that the downgrade model, the SEER risk rank model, and the SEER rating model produce similar type-one 
vs. type-two tradeoffs for most of the range of errors for 1994-95 downgrades. The downgrade and SEER rating models do slightly
outperform the SEER risk rank model, largely because the coefficients of the risk rank model are fixed. The downgrade model
slightly outperforms both the SEER risk rank model and the SEER rating model as a tool for flagging downgrade candidates in
1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98.
This Figure depicts the trade-off between the type-one error rate and the type-two error rate for the SEER risk rank model,
SEER rating model, and the downgrade model. The type-one error rate is the number of missed downgrades (false negatives) divided 
by the total number of CAMELS one- and two-rated banks; the type-two error rate is the number of incorrectly flagged downgrades 
(false positives) divided by the total number of CAMELS one- and two-rated banks. The area under each curve, divided by the total 
area in the box, offers a convenient way to compare the performance of each model. Smaller areas imply lower levels of both types of 
errors and, hence, better model performance. The 50 percent line indicates the type-one and type-two error rates associated with 
random selection of one- and two-rated banks.
Figure 2regressions. If the factors driving downgrades change
through time, then the out-of-sample performance
of a model with a fixed set of explanatory variables
should decay over a sequence of tests, even if new
coefficients for the fixed set of variables are obtained
each year. To combat this bias, we compiled an
expanded list of candidate variables based on a
review of the early warning literature.5 Next, we
identified the best subset of explanatory variables
in each year based on in-sample fit of the model.6
Specifically, our variable selection technique resem-
bled stepwise and backward-elimination variable
selection but improved upon these methods by
considering all possible combinations, rather than
adding or subtracting explanatory variables sequen-
tially. Because our technique is most effective when
the explanatory variables are not highly correlated,
we started by grouping candidates into clusters
based on correlation.7 For example, we grouped all
the nonperforming asset ratios in one problem-loan
cluster. Then, for each year, we identified the vari-
able in each cluster that was least correlated with
the variables in the other clusters. Finally, we added
this variable to the final set of explanatory variables
for that year’s downgrade-prediction model. 
As an additional robustness check, we shortened
the forecast horizon for all three models. In our
previous analysis, we compared each model’s ability
to forecast downgrades two years into the future.
Because the SEER rating model regresses this quar-
ter’s ratings on last quarter’s financial data (i.e., uses
a one-quarter lag), out-of-sample performance com-
parisons over a two-year horizon may be biased
against the shadow CAMELS. To correct for this
potential bias, we regressed downgrade status in
the first quarter of year t on financial data from the
fourth quarter of year t–1. Then, we applied the
coefficients from that model to financial data from
the fourth quarter of year t+1 to generate down-
grade probabilities. Next, we traced out power curves
for the downgrade-prediction model—and for the
two SEER models—using the first quarter of year
t+2 as a test window. Finally, we compared the areas
under each model’s power curve four times with
all three models (first quarter 1994 through first
quarter 1997) and six times for the SEER risk rank
model and the downgrade-prediction model (first
quarter of 1992 through the first quarter of 1997).
Both robustness checks confirmed our principal
empirical result—that the downgrade-prediction
model does not improve significantly over the SEER
models as a tool for flagging downgrade candidates.
In the first robustness check, we found that re-
specifying the CAMELS downgrade model annually
did not improve its out-of-sample accuracy. Indeed,
the resulting power curves were nearly identical
to those obtained with the original downgrade-
prediction model. In the second robustness check,
we found that shortening the forecast horizon did
improve the out-of-sample performance of all three
models, presumably because predicting near events
is easier than predicting more distant ones. For
example, the average area under the downgrade-
prediction power curve improved 4.32 percentage
points (six tests), the average area under the SEER
risk rank power curve improved 3.22 percentage
points (six tests), and the average area under the
SEER rating model power curve improved by 4.55
percentage points (four tests). Still, average areas
produced by each model were fairly close: 15.28
percent for the downgrade-prediction model, 20.01
percent for the SEER risk rank model, and 16.37 per-
cent for the SEER rating model. When viewed against
the random selection benchmark, these performance
differences seem economically insignificant.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve’s off-site surveillance system
includes two econometric models that are collec-
tively known as the System for Estimating Examina-
tion Ratings (SEER). One model, the SEER risk rank
model, uses the latest financial statements to esti-
mate the probability that each Fed-supervised bank
will fail within the next two years. The other model,
the SEER rating model, uses the latest financial
statements to produce a “shadow” CAMELS rating
for each supervised bank. Banks identified as risky
by either model receive closer supervisory scrutiny
than other Fed-supervised banks. 
Because many of the banks flagged by the SEER
models have already tumbled into poor condition
and, hence, receive considerable supervisory atten-
tion, we developed an alternative model to identify
safe-and-sound banks headed for financial distress.
Such a model could help supervisors allocate scarce
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5 In addition to the papers we already cited, we drew on Cole and Gunther
(1995), Hooks (1995), Wheelock and Wilson (2000), and Estrella, Park,
and Peristiani (2000).
6 See Lawless and Singhal (1978) for details.
7 See Jackson (1991).
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on- and off-site resources by pointing to banks not
currently under scrutiny that need watching. Specifi-
cally, we estimated a model to flag banks with com-
posite CAMELS ratings of one and two that are likely
to receive downgrades to composite ratings of three,
four, or five in the next two years. We then compared
the out-of-sample performance of the model and
the SEER models as tools for identifying downgrade
candidates. 
Over a range of two-year test windows in the
1990s, we found that the CAMELS downgrade model
outperformed the SEER models by only a small
margin. Our evidence suggests that, during rela-
tively tranquil banking times such as the 1990s, a
downgrade-prediction model contributes little to the
Federal Reserve’s off-site surveillance framework.
Our evidence also indirectly validates the perfor-
mance of the current SEER framework as a tool for
supporting on-site examinations by the Federal
Reserve.
Our evidence does not imply, however, that
downgrade-prediction models have no role to play
in off-site surveillance. Our sample period is marked
by the longest economic expansion in U.S. history.
During this period, the U.S. banking industry enjoyed
robust profitability and healthy asset quality. Indeed,
downgrades to unsatisfactory status as well as out-
right failures dropped off considerably in the 1990s
relative to the 1980s. A possible interpretation of
our findings is that one early warning model is as
good as another when financial distress in the
banking industry is relatively rare. The downgrade-
prediction model could materially outperform the
SEER models in a different economic climate—for
example, the early stages of a contraction in which
downgrades are frequent but failures still relatively
rare. Only a series of out-of-sample tests that span
the business cycle can conclusively determine the
value added by a CAMELS downgrade model. 
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